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Marcin Kaczmarski
The Chinese leader Xi Jinping presented the concept of the New Silk Road – a collection of land 
and maritime routes – in autumn 2013. Initially, it envisaged the creation of a network of in-
frastructural connections, mainly transport corridors, between China and its most important 
economic partner – Europe. The concept grew in importance throughout 2014 to become the 
key instrument of China’s foreign policy, especially in the areas of public diplomacy and soft 
power. Towards the end of 2014, the Chinese government announced it would establish a Silk 
Road Fund worth US$40 billion. 
The New Silk Road idea is a flexible formula used by China in its dialogue with many other 
countries. Its inclusive nature helps contribute to diluting the negative impression caused by 
China’s rapid economic expansion and assertiveness in foreign policy, especially with regard 
to its neighbours. The process of implementing the New Silk Road concept will allow China to 
expand its influence within its neighbourhood: in Central and South-Eastern Asia. The New 
Silk Road will be an alternative point of reference to the US dominance and Russian integra-
tion projects in these regions. The concept will legitimise and facilitate the growth of China’s 
influence in the transit countries on the route to Western Europe, i.e. in the Middle East (Arab 
countries, Israel and Turkey, the Horn of Africa and Central Europe (the Balkans and the Viseg-
rad Group countries). This concept is also essential for China’s domestic policy. It has become 
one of Xi Jinping’s main political projects. It will boost the development of China’s central and 
western provinces. The fact that the concept is open and not fully defined means that it will 
be a success regardless of the extent to which it will be implemented in practice. Its flexible 
nature allows China to continue investments already initiated bilaterally and to present them 
as components of the New Silk Road concept. 
The genesis and evolution  
of the New Silk Road concept
The New Silk Road concept was first presented in 
public by the president of the People’s Republic of 
China, Xi Jinping, in September 2013 during his 
visit to Kazakhstan. He came up with the proposal 
to create a Silk Road Economic Belt. In October 
2013, during his trip to Indonesia, he presented 
a parallel initiative, the 21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road. The idea of reviving the Silk Road became 
popular in China in the media and expert circles, 
who coined the slogan “One Belt and One Road”.
Throughout 2014, the concept gradually came to 
be the pivotal issue in China’s foreign policy and, 
to a lesser extent, in its domestic policy. Initial-
ly, it remained vague and did not envisage that 
institutional action would be taken as part of its 
implementation. However, the Chinese govern-
ment created a financial framework of the New 
Silk Road towards the end of 2014. Xi Jinping de-
clared that China would be establishing a US$40 
billion New Silk Road Fund. The Asian Infrastruc-
ture Investment Bank (AIIB), which was found-
2OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 161
ed by China and twenty other Asian countries 
in November 2014, will be an additional source 
of funds. In January 2015 it was promised that 
a private Energy Development Fund would be 
created. This fund is planning to attract invest-
ments worth US$20 billion as part of the imple-
mentation of the New Silk Road concept. 
The concept of the land and maritime New Silk 
Road provides for the creation of a network 
of transport corridors that will connect China 
with the European Union, China’s number one 
trade partner (in 2013, total trade was US$559 
billion). This means that transport infrastruc-
ture (railway, including high-speed railway, and 
road infrastructure), inland and maritime ports 
and airports will be built or modernised, and 
that transport (oil and gas pipelines) and tele-
communication infrastructure will be created. 
The official version of the New Silk Road’s route 
published on the website of the governmental 
news agency Xinhua shows one variant of the 
land section and one of the maritime sections 
that will connect in northern Italy. However, 
this variant is oversimplified, because the con-
cept of the New Silk Road is a conglomerate of 
routes and envisages more than ten variants 
of transport connections between China and 
Europe. Furthermore, the individual variants 
are not mutually exclusive (see Appendix 1). 
Some infrastructural investments that will form 
elements of the New Silk Road, such as roads and 
pipelines in the countries of Central Asia or rail-
way connections with Poland and Germany, had 
already been implemented before the concept 
was announced (see Appendix 2). Many of these 
moves were not coordinated. The idea of the 
New Silk Road became a political superstructure 
for them and provided grounds for measures al-
ready undertaken by China which had previously 
been treated as autonomous moves of a bilateral 
or multilateral nature. Existing projects or invest-
ments in progress can be incorporated into the 
new concept without additional moves or costs. 
However, the significance the Chinese govern-
ment attaches to the New Silk Road concept 
extends beyond the construction of transport 
infrastructure between China and Europe. Al-
ready the first outline of the idea presented by 
President Xi in Astana suggested that China’s 
ambitions were bigger. Among the goals of 
building the New Silk Road which Xi mentioned 
were: the facilitation of trade and investments, 
promoting settlements in local currency, and 
enhancing interpersonal contacts. When he 
was presenting the maritime variant of the New 
Silk Road, Xi Jinping focused on integration 
between China and the member states of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASE-
AN). Although the New Silk Road concept was 
initially targeted at the countries neighbouring 
with China, in 2014 it was transformed into 
a versatile instrument of Chinese policy. 
The New Silk Road concept 
as an instrument in China’s foreign policy 
The New Silk Road concept has become an in-
strument of China’s foreign policy in both the 
regional and global dimensions. The procla-
mation of the idea of the New Silk Road does 
not necessarily have to bring about any major 
change in the policy which China has pursued 
thus far: investments in individual countries may 
still continue in the bilateral dialogue format, 
and they can be presented as being an element 
of one project under the banner of the New Silk 
Road only when they have been completed.
The idea of the New Silk Road is deeply rooted 
in the historical context. The concept draws on 
the routes which existed between the 3rd centu-
ry BC and the 15th century AD and were used for 
trade and cultural exchange between China and 
Europe. It thus directly refers to the glory days 
of the Chinese Civilisation, when China was the 
The New Silk Road concept has become the 
key instrument of China’s foreign policy.
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centre of the world and was dominant within 
its neighbourhood. The historical and cultural 
references are intended to give the concept an 
unambiguously positive meaning. 
The New Silk Road concept is becoming a key 
element of China’s public diplomacy and soft 
power. The concept is presented in an informa-
tion and propaganda setting, covering cultur-
al events, expert meetings and tourist routes. 
A special website of the Xinhua news agency 
has been launched. Chinese experts are promot-
ing slogans like the “Chinese version of the Mar-
shall Plan”. The concept is a kind of ‘packaging’ 
for China’s economic expansion, lending it 
an attractive form. Presenting this expansion 
as an element of multilateral co-operation ben-
eficial for both China and its partners will make 
it possible to reduce any potential concerns in 
the countries which are the objects of this ex-
pansion. The concept is also meant to be an 
illustration of the Chinese philosophy of in-
ternational relations where all the countries 
engaged are winners (a popularisation of the 
win-win formula). It is also intended to promote 
the image of China as a ‘benign’ power. The 
New Silk Road concept will also make it possible 
to at least partly neutralise the negative impres-
sion which has been observed over the past few 
years due to China’s increasing assertiveness, 
visible especially in the territorial disputes in the 
East and South China Seas. 
The New Silk Road concept provides China with 
a flexible formula of dialogue with a number 
of actors, from the neighbouring countries in 
Central and South-Eastern Asia through the tran-
sit countries in the Middle East and Eastern and 
Northern Africa, to European countries, both EU 
member states and those outside the EU. China 
can ‘sell’ this concept to individual countries and 
regions. This is a useful way for China to organise 
multilateral co-operation without openly forming 
a pro-Chinese and anti-Western organisation that 
would have scared off potential participants. Chi-
na can promote its project in a total of around 50 
countries. The countries which have already ex-
pressed they are ready to participate in the proj-
ect include: Kazakhstan, Cambodia, Laos, Sri Lan-
ka, the Maldives, Poland, Lithuania, Russia, Israel, 
Austria, Greece, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, 
Indonesia and Egypt. A number of international 
meetings that are presented as being linked to the 
New Silk Road are being already held at different 
levels. At the present stage, the concept is used 
for holding meetings with potentially interested 
countries (for example, the New Silk Road trans-
port summit held in Urumqi in September 2014).
Unlike European integration or the initiatives pro-
moted by Russia in the CIS area, the New Silk Road 
concept is an open political project, without clear-
ly defined boundaries. As a consequence of this, it 
will be a base for the development of Chinese 
political influence and will enable a non-for-
malised formula of multilateral co-operation to be 
built. The maritime route may legitimise the inten-
sified presence and activity of the Chinese navy in 
the World Ocean under the pretext of protecting 
Chinese trade. The countries invited to co-operate 
as part of this concept will find it difficult to turn 
down this offer due to the language of mutual 
benefit used by Chinese diplomacy and the high 
degree of the concept’s openness (for example, 
an intensive discussion is taking place in India 
now as to whether it should join the New Silk 
Road). Furthermore, the fact that a given coun-
try will not participate in the project will not pose 
any major challenge from China’s point of view, 
given the open and flexible nature of the concept. 
The New Silk Road concept offers a point of 
reference which is an alternative to US dom-
inance, especially in East Asia, but also with re-
The New Silk Road concept provides Chi-
na with a flexible formula of dialogue with 
a number of actors, from the neighbour-
ing countries in Central and South-East-
ern Asia through the transit countries in 
the Middle East, to European countries.
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gard to other powers in Eurasia, such as Russia 
or India. In the long term, the concept is becom-
ing an element of the construction of the Chi-
nese international order, which is alternative to 
the one dominated by the United States. The 
establishment of the New Silk Road Fund was 
preceded by the formation of a new Asian de-
velopment bank, fostering the idea of building 
a new security architecture in Asia without the 
US being involved (this was put forward by Xi 
Jinping during the CICA summit in May 2014 in 
Shanghai) and supporting the idea of creating 
a free trade are as part of APEC (this being a re-
sponse to the American Trans-Pacific Partnership 
project bypassing China). The New Silk Road is 
expected to make it more difficult for the United 
States to carry out its pivot towards Asia and to 
negate the concept of America’s so-called ‘New 
Silk Road Initiative’ (put forward by Hillary Clin-
ton back in 2011), running through Afghanistan. 
The New Silk Road may contribute to the emer-
gence of a pro-Chinese orientation in the foreign 
policies of the countries through which it runs. 
The New Silk Road as a framework 
for the implementation of China’s policy 
with regard to selected countries
Both the concept itself and the process of its 
implementation will aid China in achieving its 
goals with regard to a number of countries. 
In the case of Russia and the countries of Cen-
tral Asia, this concept is China’s response to the 
integration project promoted by Moscow – the 
Eurasian Economic Union. The Chinese concept, 
which is based on different principles than the 
Russian idea, makes it possible for Beijing to pro-
tect its economic interests in Central Asia without 
the need to openly compete with Russia. Further-
more, by treating Russia as an essential element 
of the New Silk Road (see Appendix 1) they will 
help reduce Russia’s dislike of the project. It also 
creates the impression that this is a positive-sum 
game, and thus Russia may be convinced that it 
is not worth opposing Chinese projects in Cen-
tral Asia. It is worth noting that the official map 
of the New Silk Road published by the Chinese 
governmental news agency Xinhua has been 
changed. Originally, the land route bypassed 
Russia, and in the present version it runs through 
Russia. The Eurasian Economic Union could facili-
tate the implementation of this project to China, 
if a common transport area was created, but on 
condition that no new barriers were added. Even 
though Russia is envisaged as part of the New Silk 
Road, this initiative may undermine Russia’s own 
plans to breathe life back into the Trans-Siberian 
railway infrastructure, especially in the eastern 
part. The implementation of the New Silk Road 
may also ameliorate potential Russian-Chinese 
disputes over the so-called ‘Northern Sea Route’ 
running through the Arctic. 
As regards the ASEAN countries, the concept of 
the New Silk Road and its implementation will 
on the one hand be used to take the edge off 
the impression of China’s assertiveness and on 
the other will enable China to protect its inter-
ests more successfully in territorial disputes. In-
vestments in individual countries (for example, 
a planned railway in Thailand and a container 
port in Malaysia) will create a durable platform 
for co-operation. At the same time, the Maritime 
Silk Route concept legitimises the intensified 
presence of China’s navy in disputed waters and 
the fact that it has been tasked with protecting 
maritime routes; ports in Pakistan, Myanmar 
and Sri Lanka will also serve the same purpose. 
The New Silk Road concept creates a platform 
for dialogue between China and the countries 
The New Silk Road concept offers a point 
of reference which is an alternative to US 
dominance, but in the case of Russia and 
the countries of Central Asia, this concept 
is China’s response to the integration pro-
ject promoted by Moscow – the Eurasian 
Economic Union.
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of South Asia. Regardless of whether India joins 
the concept, China’s position in dealings with it 
is set to improve. While promoting the New Silk 
Road concept, China has intensified relations 
with countries which are viewed as India’s close 
partners: Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Ne-
pal and Bangladesh play a role in the connec-
tion between China and the Indian Ocean, and 
thus the Strait of Malacca can be bypassed. Sri 
Lanka or the Maldives might become a key point 
for China’s navy, allowing it to maintain a con-
stant presence in the Indian Ocean. By bringing 
India into the project, China may neutralise its 
resistance. India wants investments in port in-
frastructure, and this may convince it to co-op-
erate with China. It is also a member of the AIIB. 
In turn, if New Delhi refuses to co-operate, In-
dia may lose its influence in the countries which 
want to use potential Chinese funding. 
Both the New Silk Road concept and its imple-
mentation are opening up opportunities for Chi-
na to increase its influence in the Middle East. 
The New Silk Road will be especially important 
for China’s relations with Egypt and Israel. Chi-
na is at present considering two large transport 
projects: digging a second canal to run parallel 
to the Suez Canal and building a railway in Israel 
that will enable the canal to be bypassed. The 
New Silk Road concept is also a way to enhance 
co-operation between China and Turkey. It may 
also serve as an instrument that will make China 
more open to Iran as a consequence of building 
a connection via Central Asia. 
The New Silk Road vs. Europe 
Europe is China’s most important economic part-
ner. The implementation of the New Silk Road 
concept in the narrow scope – the construc-
tion of infrastructural connections – will make 
it possible to increase trade. Even if the project 
is implemented in part, China will have better 
access to the European market and will find 
it easier to enhance co-operation with the EU. 
Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) may play an es-
sential role as a transit area and a place of en-
try to the Western European market. China’s 
total trade with CEE reaches US$40 billion, i.e. 
less than 10% of its trade with the EU. There-
fore, this region will not be a major recipient 
of Chinese goods. However, CEE may play the 
role of a gateway to Western Europe, with its 
maritime and inland ports. Infrastructure in 
CEE is still underdeveloped – the lack of stan-
dards and incomplete double tracks and elec-
trification. Chinese experts emphasise that this 
offers China a chance to become engaged in 
the construction of infrastructure in CEE, espe-
cially the modernisation and electrification of 
railways, while avoiding a conflict with the EU. 
The New Silk Road concept and its significance 
for CEE need to be viewed within the wider con-
text of China’s relations with this region. From 
China’s viewpoint, the region’s location is its 
main advantage. China expects that CEE coun-
tries with open markets will back an agreement 
introducing investments and a free trade area. 
Furthermore, CEE countries could be used as 
a forum where Chinese products can be im-
proved and marketed before they are fully in-
troduced to the European market. CEE countries 
will benefit from Chinese funding, and China 
will have a good testing ground for investments 
in the EU. Good relations with China and the ab-
sence of a history of conflicts contribute to low-
ering strategic resistance to Chinese initiatives. 
The maritime route will enter Europe as a nat-
ural consequence from the south (Greece) and 
will favour the Balkan countries and Hungary. 
In turn, the shortest version of the land route 
leads to Germany via Poland. Greece is viewed 
as a point which connects the maritime and the 
land routes. Meanwhile, Poland sees itself as 
The New Silk Road does not have to gen-
erate rivalry between Central European 
countries.
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the main hub on the western end of the New 
Silk Road, used for the transit and transport of 
Chinese goods. However, the New Silk Road 
does not have to generate rivalry between 
Central European countries, since different 
route variants are not mutually exclusive and 
will supplement one another. However, at pres-
ent they may lead to competition between in-
dividual countries for the investments that will 
be an indispensable element of the route. The 
highest risk for CEE countries is the possibility of 
a ‘race to the bottom’ for Chinese investments 
(this risk has been present for several years and 
is independent of the New Silk Road concept). 
In the short term, the existence of two main 
entry points to Europe may divide the Visegrad 
Group – Poland and Hungary have had the best 
positions so far. The Baltic states also hope to 
benefit from the New Silk Road.
The New Silk Road concept 
as a domestic policy instrument 
In the area of domestic policy, the New Silk 
Road concept is a personal project of China’s 
new leader, Xi Jinping. This plan cannot fail 
mainly because its objectives are not clearly 
defined and it is based on an open concept. A 
whole range of moves made as part of foreign 
and economic policy can be included in the New 
Silk Road and presented as a success. Drawing 
on the glory days of Chinese civilisation is in-
tended at legitimising the Communist Party and 
its achievements in the international arena. 
In the area of economic policy, the New Silk 
Road will promote the development and eco-
nomic growth of the central and western prov-
inces of China. This concept is thus becoming 
an instrument in the policy of both Beijing 
(levelling out the differences on the scale of 
the whole country) and of individual provinc-
es (competing with each other in the area of 
economic co-operation with foreign countries). 
The goals of Chinese provinces include promot-
ing exports of goods and labour, and demon-
strating their success in this area to the central 
government. However, subsidies for transport 
corridors offered by the central and western 
provinces and transport price competition ad-
versely affect the rational use of the New Silk 
Road. The project can be used as an instrument 
in the policy of Chinese provinces allowing them 
to meet such criteria as export volume, export 
of workforce, and gaining experience in a given 
area. However, the Chinese government is likely 
to take action aimed at limiting this rivalry and 
the co-operation of individual provinces during 
the implementation of this concept. 
Implementation of the New Silk Road’s guide-
lines will also become a way to diversify in-
vestments and bring part of Chinese reserves 
into use. This will also contribute to boosting 
exports of capital and workforce and to diver-
sifying investments. The construction of infra-
structure will make it possible for Chinese firms 
to increase their engagement worldwide. 
The prospects of the implementation 
of the New Silk Road
The implementation of the New Silk Road concept 
will to a huge extent depend on China. Building 
new connections makes sense at least because 
of the volume of Chinese trade with individual 
regions through which the land or the maritime 
variants of the New Silk Road will run: with Eu-
rope (US$559 billion), ASEAN (US$443 billion), 
the Middle East (US$257 billion), Africa (US$192 
billion) and the CIS (US$150 billion). Given the 
open and imprecise nature of the concept, it may 
be expected that the concept will be implement-
ed as part of bilateral relations, a formula now in 
The New Silk Road project cannot fail 
mainly because its objectives are not 
clearly defined and it is based on an open 
concept.
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APPENDIX 1
Variants and routes of the New Silk Road
Both the land and the maritime versions of the New Silk Road will connect China to Europe. The con-
cept alone includes several main and a dozen or so intermediate variants of the routes which the New 
Silk Road may take. Since various terms are used to describe the same variants of the New Silk Road, 
it is recommended that potential variants be characterised in terms of key elements which influence 
the choice of individual routes. More importantly, the individual variants are not mutually exclusive; 
they are rather a conglomerate of routes which can be built at the same time. Nevertheless, if any 
of the variants is granted priority, this variant will be stronger in comparison to the remaining ones.
use. The decision as to when the concept’s suc-
cess should be announced will be up to Beijing. 
Previous experience also suggests that projects as 
part of the New Silk Road concept will be imple-
mented in parallel rather than stage by stage. 
However, a number of limitations which may ob-
struct the process of the concept’s implementa-
tion can be pointed to at the present stage.
The development of existing railway connections 
between China and Europe is the core of the 
land section’s concept. At present, railway trans-
port is used in only a small part of Chinese trade 
(3.5% of Chinese exports to the EU are trans-
ported by land). The main advantage of this is 
its much lower cost when compared to air trans-
port and the fact that it is several times quicker 
than maritime transport. It takes 12-16 days to 
transport goods from central China to Germa-
ny by railway, and 50-60 days by ship. Railway 
transport will thus be appropriate for a specific 
group of goods, where it does not pay to trans-
port them by air freight but maritime transport 
takes too long. The railway network will never 
be a predominant means of transport; it will 
remain an addition to maritime transport. 
The most serious impediments to the imple-
mentation of the concept include customs 
procedures and differences in railway sys-
tems, which extend the time of transport. In-
teroperability of railway connections is difficult 
to achieve since the New Silk Road runs through 
three railway systems: the Chinese, the post-So-
viet and the European. An additional challenge 
will be posed by Russia’s integration projects 
as part of the Eurasian Economic Union, since 
this may impede the harmonisation and simpli-
fication of customs procedures. The decision to 
build new (standard gauge) railways in Eurasia 
may be of key importance in the context of the 
New Silk Road. Russia opposes such plans, es-
pecially with regard to Kazakhstan, and does 
not want a railway connection to be built from 
China to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In addition 
to this, the various actors disagree about the 
shape of the route and its individual variants. 
The rivalry is especially evident between the EU 
and Russia. The New Silk Road also depends on 
the political developments in the numerous ter-
ritories it runs through. Transport via Ukraine 
became less attractive when China withdrew 
from the plans to build a deep port in Crimea 
following its annexation. The lack of goods that 
could be exported to China is a great challenge, 
especially for Central Europe. The trains go back 
empty, and the containers are often sent back 
to China by sea, which extends the time and 
increases the costs. The list of potential goods 
includes cars and medicines. Breaks need to 
be made in the winter season due to the low 
temperatures. As a consequence, some carriers 
started buying special thermo-insulated car-
riages that enable year-round transport. 
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APPENDIX 2
Khorgos, an inland port on the border with Kazakhstan, will be the starting point of the land route 
of the New Silk Road in China.  
The first question is what role Russia should play. China needs to solve the dilemma as to what extent the 
New Silk Road should run through Russian territory (this would ensure the shortest route to Europe). If the 
Russian border needs to be crossed, two variants can be used. One of them envisages the use of the lon-
gest possible section of the Trans-Siberian Railway (possible entry points are: directly from north-eastern 
China; from northern China via Mongolia; and from western China via Kazakhstan). In the second version 
the Trans-Siberian Railway would not be used at all – the greater part of the Asian section of the route 
would run through Kazakhstan, the south-western part of Russia (areas around Volgograd) and Ukraine. 
If Russia is bypassed, two other basic elements are also possible. One of them provides for connecting rail-
way and maritime transport and directing the New Silk Road via the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus 
countries to Turkey. If the second variant is chosen, this will be a land route and will run through the northern 
part of Iran to Turkey. When the New Silk Road enters Turkey, another possible variant will be to continue 
transport via the Black Sea to Romanian ports, but this would raise the costs of implementing the project. 
Another issue is the entry of the New Silk Road’s land part to Europe. In this case three main variants 
are possible. The first, northern, one provides for transport via Poland to Germany and possibly on 
to other Western European countries. The second one provides for entry via Slovakia in the direction 
of Vienna. In the third variant, the New Silk Road enters Europe via Bulgaria and runs northwards. 
The maritime route will begin in Guangdong Province in south eastern China and run along the So-
uth-Eastern Asia coastline via the Strait of Malacca, Sri Lanka, the Indian Ocean, the Horn of Africa 
and the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean Sea. From here it can split into ports in northern and so-
uthern Europe, connecting with the land route in the latter case. Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Egypt and 
Israel will play an essential role in the case of the maritime route. 
The maritime route can be supplemented with a land transport corridor connecting China with My-
anmar, Bangladesh and India, reaching the Indian Ocean and bypassing the Strait of Malacca. Its parallel 
variant could be a corridor running through Pakistan and reaching the Indian Ocean. The New Silk Road 
would run from Yunnan Province via Myanmar to Dhaka (Bangladesh) and then to Calcutta (India). 
The maritime and the land routes may connect in two variants. The first one envisages entry to Eu-
rope via Greek ports, from which the route would run northwards (Serbia, Hungary and Vienna). In 
the second variant the New Silk Road enters Europe via Italian ports on the Adriatic Sea and goes on 
to Western Europe. The ports which have been considered in individual variants are: Piraeus, Thes-
saloniki (Greece), Bar (Macedonia) and Koper (Slovenia).
Progress in the implementation of the New Silk Road
Some of the infrastructural connections between China and Europe which are to form the core of the 
New Silk Road’s land route are already in use. These include railway connections: from Chongqing to 
Duisburg (since October 2011); from Wuhan to Prague (since October 2012); from Chengdu to Lodz 
(since October 2013); from Zhengzhou to Hamburg (since July 2013); from Suzhou to Warsaw (since 
October 2013); from Changsha to Duisburg (since November 2014). The railway connection between 
Yiwu and Madrid is the latest launched so far (the operators are considering whether it should be-
come a regular connection). 
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Variants of the New Silk Road
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Source: http://www.scmp.com/business/economy/article/1657286/silk-road-subsidies-undermine-rail-link
There are also railway connections which can be included in the routes forming the New Silk Road: 
• between the Asian and the European parts of Istanbul (a submarine tunnel);
• the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran connection;
• connections offered by the Chinese high-speed railway reaching its western provinces.
Piraeus, a Greek port leased by a Chinese company, is the first budding of the maritime part of the 
New Silk Road. It has shortened the time of the transport of Chinese goods to Europe by around one 
week, since they do not go to ports in Northern Europe. 
The planned high-speed railway connecting Belgrade and Budapest, which will facilitate the transport 
of goods from Greece to European markets, is a flagship project as part of connecting the maritime 
and the land routes of the New Silk Road. A memorandum concerning this project was signed in No-
vember 2013, and a contract was signed in December 2014. Construction is planned to commence in 
2015 and to be completed in 2017. The 2 billion euros it costs will be paid for by China’s Exim Bank, and 
the construction work will be entrusted to the state-owned China Railway and Construction Corpora-
tion. However, there are no precise plans for building a railway connection between Greece and Serbia. 
